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GOD AND GADAMER: POLITICS AND CONFLICT
IN THE HEAVENLY FAMILY
Recent scholarship has applied the insights of the law-and-economics school to such diverse areas as torts,I property,2 divorce
law,3 and medical,4 dental,s and clerical-theological practice and
malpractice.6 The fecundity of such research has seemed almost
unlimited. It was no surprise to learn, therefore, that after years of
analysis scholars at this university will soon announce that God was
almost surely an economist. Their conclusion has followed an intensive examination of the Ten Commandments as they embody a
desire on the part of the Almighty to promote Allocative Efficiency.
The originators of this theory (whose last work examined the
role of transaction costs in the Garden of Eden) are expected to
make their work available to the public in the form of a book entitled "Optimality and the Almighty" to be published in July by the
University of Chicago Press. The flavor can be imparted, however,
by reviewing a few of the book's principal findings.
Chapter Two demonstrates that the Eighth Commandment
(Thou Shalt Not Steal) is a potent maximizer of efficiency. Theft is
easily shown to be inefficient, and prohibitions of theft are consistent with and almost certainly the product of a recognition that the
production of scarce resources will be maximized if theft is punished and deterred. Similarly, Chapter Four establishes the case for
discouraging the coveting of neighbor's wives, manservants, or
oxen. Coveting is not only time-consuming and nonproductive in
itself, but may lead to actual stealing, which has already been shown
to be grossly inefficient (see above). In the same fashion, time spent
worshiping the true God is shown to lead to substantial benefits,
both present and future, while time invested in building and worshiping false graven images and other false gods is wasted; efficiency
requires that a maximizer invest time and effort in endeavors that
are likely to produce optimal returns.
I. Cf G. CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND EcONOMIC ANALYSIS (1970).
2. SeeR. PosNER, EcoNOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 10-41 (1972).
3. /d. at 62-64.
4. /d. at 72.
S. See Farber, Post-Modem Dental Studies, 4 CoNST. COMM. 219 (1987).
6. Hoppe, The Great God Buyout, San Francisco Chron., Aprill7, 1987, at 67, col. I.
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By Chapter Nine it is clear that none of the Commandments is
incapable of being explained in law and economics terms. For example, the Commandment not to take the Lord's name in vain
(treated in Chapter Six) might at first glance appear to express nonutilitarian principles. Yet the purpose of the prohibition is manifestly to avoid time-wasting and futile calls, imprecations, and
curses. A secondary, but still Pareto optimal, purpose, is to avoid
wasting the time and energy of the Deity himself. For whenever
God's name is called, He must perk his ears and may lose track of
whatever He is doing at the time-such as noting a sparrow's fall.
Since God is a maximizer, such interferences are prohibited as
inefficient.
Those familiar with law and economics literature might be unsurprised by the work we have just summarized. The purpose of
this Comment, however, is to outline the case for a proposition
more surprising than that God is a Posnerian. We posit that Jesus
was a Crit, a member of the Critical Legal Studies school that has
risen to prominence in the last ten years. In Part I we outline our
case for this proposition. In Part II we speculate on some of the
possible reasons for the split in philosophy between God and His
Son, concluding with some of the possible ramifications of this surprising revelation.
I.

CRITICAL THOUGHT AND THE LAMB

Recent work at the University of Wisconsin Law School has
resulted in the conclusion that Jesus Christ, son of God, was a Crit.
The case for Jesus's membership in this loose-knit coalition of legal
scholars and left-leaning lawyers rests on several grounds, and is no
less compelling than that advanced by the Chicago scholars as to
God's philosophical affiliation. 1
Jesus, as everyone knows, was an anti-hierarchists who is well
known for authoring such attacks on the existing order as "the
meek shall inherit the earth" and "blessed are the peacemakers."
He urged His followers to question illegitimate hierarchy and to
"render unto Caesar only that which was Caesar's." Abjuring professionalism, Jesus broke down barriers between the church and organized medicine, for example. His healing of lepers, cripples, the
7. A forthcoming work will examine the possibility that the Devil was the progenitor
of classical legal thought. See ]. KIDWELL & R. DELGADO, THE FIEND AND FORMALISM:
WAS LUCIFER A LANGDELLIAN'? (1989, unpublished). The book explores the sordid truth
revealed in the phrase, "To play the Devil's Advocate."
8. See generally, THE PoLmCS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRmQUE (D. Kairys ed.
1982).
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halt and the blind are good examples of this aspect of his antihegemonic philosophy. He gave short shrift to capitalism and
capitalists, casting money-lenders out of the temple. His teaching
echoed the irrationalists' emphasis on indeterminacy as well-note,
for example His insistence that salvation cannot be guaranteed by
the performance of a specified quota of good works, but rather is
rooted in the highly nonformal, subjectivist experience of grace and
redemption.
Jesus also prefigured CLS's use of word-play, irony, puns and
satire as deconstructionist devices.9 We have an excellent example
of this in his allegorical remark that "it is as difficult for a rich man
to reach the kingdom of heaven as it is for a camel to pass through
the eye of a needle." Imagine the discomfort of a wealthy industrialist or money-lender being compared to a large, bloated camel,
humps and all, trying to squeeze through that tiny aperture. The
remark is pointed as well; it was undoubtedly advertent that Jesus
chose the metaphor of the needle to drive home His point.
For these and other reasons to be adduced in later writing the
members of our research team conclude that Jesus was indeed a
member of CLS. The final section explores the possible reasons for
this rather interesting split in the high theological family, together
with the possibility of eventual reconciliation.
REASONS FOR, AND IMPLICATIONS OF, THE LAWAND-ECONOMICS/CRITICAL-LEGAL-STUDIES
SPLIT BETWEEN THE HEAVENLY
ACTORS

II.

The evidence convincingly demonstrates that God is a member
of the law and economics school while his son, Jesus, is a Crit. How
did this come to pass?
There are a number of possibilities. The simplest answer is offered by psychological science: intergenerational conflict among
members of a family is one of the most widely experienced phenomena in the Universe. Jesus may have opted for the Critical movement simply for the reason that His Father did not.
A second reason may be found by the application of structural
historical analysis. Although we are quick to note that one must
not fall into the trap of overdeterminism, it seems to us that the
explanation for the God/Jesus split may lie in the different eras and
9.

We hasten to add that these approaches are not entirely without risk, see S.
(1989, out of print).

RUSHDIE, SATANIC VERSES
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social conditions prevailing during the periods when the subjects of
our study were most active. God's principal work, as everyone
knows, was to build the world and Universe. It may be that law
and economics has a powerful intellectual hold on those who are
active during times of early industrialist activity. Jesus, by contrast,
came upon the scene several eons later, when societies and nations
were already established and were, from the perspective at least of
the hunter-gatherers, post-modern societies. Consequently it would
be natural that He might see Himself and His environment in different terms. In particular, it may have seemed to Him that His principal challenge lay in helping humanity overcome the barriers of
alienation and individualism that previous eras had built up and in
achieving a more cooperative, communal world based on love and
reciprocity. God, by contrast, may have been more concerned with
getting things to run right, thus His insistence on efficient arrangements and bright-line rules, such as Thou Shalt Not Steal.
What are some of the implications of the divergence in philosophy between these giant figures? It seems to us that the solution
must be found in general principles of Family Law, and thus we
defer any answer until we hear from our colleagues who work in
this area: We have provided them with the result of our own work,
and are eagerly awaiting their analysis. But a couple of preliminary
observations may be in order. First, it seems to us that both God
and Jesus must learn to live with each other despite their differences
in philosophy. These differences seem rooted in deeply held world
views and, if history teaches us anything, are unlikely to change.
The family members must overcome their urge to proselytize and
instead pursue a higher synthesis, which we can only hope they will
reach soon. Second, Family Law theory holds that most conflict
within families, including Governing ones like God and Jesus, is
best resolved within that institution, that is without calling upon
outside authority, even if such exists.
Our basic thrust is thus, ultimately hopeful. Although God
and Jesus view the world through quite different prisms, those views
may ultimately be reconcilable. And to the extent that they are not,
the two principals may nevertheless determine to transcend their
differences in the name of familial harmony. Perhaps family ther-
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apy and mediation will provide the structure within which an accommodation can be reached.IO
Richard Delgadoii
John Kidwel1I2

• • • •
Editors' Note: In our view, this breakthrough work raises many
significant questions. We are flattered that the authors chose to
publish with us, rather than work their thesis up as a sixty-page
article in the Yale Law Journal. Among the intriguing issues raised
by the work are the following:
I. Is the Holy Ghost a Legal Process theorist?
2. Should Jesus have gotten tenure?
3. Does publication of this article violate the establishment clause? Would it
help if we added a picture of Santa?13

10. See generally, S. GoLDBERG, E. GREEN, & F. SANDER, DISPUTE RESOLUTION
(1985). A role for the Holy Ghost remains a shadowy, but tantalizing, possibility. Could an
incorporeal being serve as a mediator? We leave this question for later treatment by other
scholars. See Delgado, et al., Fairness and Formality: Minimizing the Risk of Prejudice in
Alternative Dispute Resolution, 1985 Wise. L. REV. 1359 (implying that disembodied thirdparty facilitators might be fairer than other kinds).
II. Professor of Law, University of Wisconsin.
12. Professor of Law, University of Wisconsin.
13. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984).

